Raja v. Commonwealth , 40Va. App. 710, 581 S.E.2d 237 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)

The court affirmed the defendant's conviction for stalking.  The court held that the arrest warrant was not defective.  The charge of stalking, by its very nature, involved multiple instances of conduct, taking place on "expansive dates."  In such cases where the date of the offense is "not the essence of the offense" nor "shown to be significant," the Commonwealth was not required to charge that it occurred on a specific date.  The court also held that Richmond was the proper venue to try the stalking charge.  Based on the evidence, the circuit court judge was entitled to conclude that the defendant engaged in at least one event in the City of Richmond in which he intended or knew that his conduct would place the victim or her new husband in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily harm.  The evidence was sufficient to give rise to a "strong presumption" that at least one incident proscribed by the stalking statute took place in the City of Richmond.

Bowen v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 377, 499 S.E.2d 20 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)

The court overturned the defendant's stalking conviction and remanded the case back to the lower court to be retried.  The court held that the stalking statute required proof that the defendant either intended to place the victim in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury, or knew that such fear would result from his conduct.  The trial court in this case used the wrong standard of proof of intent .

Parker v. Commonwealth, 24Va. App. 681, 485 S.E.2d 150 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)

The court upheld the defendant's stalking conviction and found that the evidence was sufficient to convict him and that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad.  In stalking cases, the state had to prove three elements: that the defendant engaged in multiple instances of conduct directed at a person or the person's spouse or child; that this conduct caused that person (or their spouse or child) to experience reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury; and that the defendant either intended to cause this fear or knew that it would result from his or her conduct.  The defendant in this case engaged in repeated conduct (phone calls) directed at the victim, the victim was placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury by this conduct, and the defendant knew that his phone calls from jail would place the victim in fear of bodily harm.  The evidence in the record of the dynamics of the victim's relationship with the defendant supplied the necessary context for the trial court to conclude that she reasonably feared injury.  Both the "reasonable fear" element and the requirement of specific intent made the statute sufficiently clear to inform both citizens and law enforcement officers of what acts constituted stalking.  The statute was not vague or overbroad.  The purpose, to protect innocent citizens from intentional or knowingly threatening conduct that subjected them to reasonable fear of physical harm, was legitimate .